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I want to begin this paper 
with this caricature (Figure 1) of 
Filipinos that appeared in the 
Minneapolis  Tribune  in  1901. 
This caricature portrays the 
binary images of Filipinos: the 
free civilized Filipinos who 
embraced  peace,  prosperity, 
public improvement, education 
and the United States; and the 
savage and imprisoned Filipinos 
who were considered diseased, 
troublemakers and torturers 
because of their opposition to 
colonization  by  the United 
States. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
The concrete walls that separate the civilized from the savages 
are common sightings in most caricatures of U.S. imperialism. These 
images (Figures 1 and 2) reveal how the carceral structures of U.S. 
gulags, asylums, prisons and other correctional institutions have been 
extended, transported and exported to  U.S. territories and developed 
further  in  colonial  locations.  According  to  Said:  the  cultural 
construction of colonized “other” as subordinate and inferior beings are 
expressed poetically and politically in defined and regulated spaces. . . 
. These colonizing spaces of social control include the classroom, 
courthouse, prison, railway station, market place, hospital, boulevard, 
place  of  worship,  even  the  private  household  and  home,  practically 
every place used in everyday life’ (Soja, date, p. 36). 
 
Beckett and Murakawa (2012, p. 222) document the extension 
and growth of the U.S. carceral state through ‘institutional annexation 
of sites and actors beyond what is legally recognized as part of the 
criminal justice system.’ These sites include immigration and family 
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courts, civil detention 
facilities, and county clerks’ 
offices. While moving into 
these locations the penal 
state  can  ensnare  and 
shape an expanded number 
of subjects without visibly 
and legally removing the 
rights of citizens. 
 
These  less  visible  mechanisms  for  extending  penal  sanctions 
into a broader world of ‘wrongs,’ such as financial debt and 
administrative law violations, comprise what Beckett and Murakawa 
(2012) term a ‘shadow carceral state’ that grows through legally hybrid 
processes in which penal power comes to inhabit a broadening range of 
bureaucratic institutions. Michel Foucault (1995) saw the city as an 
ideal  breeding  ground  for  such  disciplinary  processes  that  creep 
beyond the openly institutionalized punishment and surveillance of 
captive bodies into the more mundane processes of daily life through 
which highly individualized urban subjects become compliant citizens; 
this is discipline that can morph discursively into un-coerced choice 
when associated with economic opportunity. In Foucault’s city, 
carcerality can inhabit the means of as well as the barriers to survival; 
the  mediative  context  of  the  city  creates  ‘natural’  processes  for 
codifying the corporal punishment of the state (Alexander, 2007) into 
the ‘punitive’ or ‘carceral city.’ The U.S. territorial administration in 
the Philippines started to rebuild the city of Manila in 1905 while still 
fighting  rebellion  and  insurgencies  in  Philippine  urban  and  rural 
areas. As the urban life of Manila expanded to form many additional 
cities that now comprise Metropolitan Manila, the battle shifted from 
open fields to urban walls. 
 
When  Daniel  Burnham,  an  American  architect  and  urban 
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designer was assigned to design the city of Manila, he was instructed 
to draw a plan (Figure 3) that would allow Americans to defend and 
control that urban region. The plan militarized urban spaces by 
facilitating within them the organization of check points, surveillance, 
curfews, policing and movement of military equipment. 
 
Located within the militarized urban space were American 
schools, a concentration camp, governmental institutions, factories and 
commercial establishments. The colonial government surrounded this 
defensible city not only with walls but also with laws that literally 
segregated ‘civilized’ colonizers from  ‘savages’ Filipinos, the educated 
from the illiterate, law abiding citizens from criminals, and  Philippine 
rebels from their comrades in captivity. These laws included the 
following 
 
Brigandage Act of  1902:  This law prohibited Filipinos from 
forming or joining any organization or nationalist movement. 
 
Reconcentration Act of 1903: This law considered people not 
belonging to any concentration camps or marked villages as bandits 
and enemies of the state. 
 
Flag   Law   Act  of  1907:  This  law  prohibited  the  display  of 
Philippine flags and other symbols not approved by the United States. 
 
Through social and 
spatial control of 
Metropolitan Manila the 
United  States  inscribed 
on Filipinos a binary 
human evolutionary 
opposition in which the 
inferior qualities of 
Filipinos necessitated 
through counterpoint the 
superiority of Americans 
who could be their saviors 
only after becoming their 
captors. 
 
At present, Metro 
Manila  has  a  population 
of 12 million at night and 
15 million in the daytime. 
There is a daily migration 
of about    three    million 
persons  to  Metro  Manila 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
for their work, education, shopping or entertainment (Robles 2012). 
“More  than  2  million—or  roughly  one  fifth  of  the  sprawling  city’s 
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population—live in informal settlements (Figure 4). They belong to the 
metropolis’ 600,000 families who are mostly living below the poverty 
line of P46 per day ($1). Most of these families also are facing eviction, 
violent demolition, and relocation to far away sites like the towns of 
San  Mateo  and  Rodriguez  in  Rizal,  Calauan  in  Laguna,  and  San 
Miguel in Bulacan.” 
 
Despite today’s high rate of economic growth, the Philippines 
has the highest unemployment rate in Asia. The number of Filipinos 
without jobs settled at 2.814 million in 2011 when the labor force 
breached the 40 million mark (Bureau of Labor and Employment 
Statistics  2012).  As  for  the  unemployed,  half  or  1.4  million  were 
between the ages of 15 and 24. Also, three out of five of the jobless 
were men (ASEAN, PDI, January 2012.) 
 
According to Walden Bello, “The country’s unemployment crisis 
will remain unresolved without a genuine thrust to develop Filipino 
manufacturing and domestic agriculture.” Unfortunately, the 
government persists in promoting neoliberal economic reforms such as 
business process outsourcing (BPO), promotion of mining and tourism, 
enclave manufacturing for export, and cheap labor export. These are 
sectors where foreign investors and economies benefit 
disproportionately more than Filipinos.”  Neoliberal forms of economy 
do not address hunger, job insecurity and poverty (Check Figure 5). 
 
Wacquant (2008, p. 70) 
argues  that  today’s  neoliberal 
state governments deploy ‘more 
state’ in the realm of the police, 
criminal courts, and prisons to 
remedy the generalized rise of 
objective  and  subjective 
insecurity, which itself is caused 
by ‘less state’ on the economic and 
social front. Waquant also argued 
that the state’s monopoly on legal 
violence is ‘not simply an instrument of the criminal justice system 
designed to punish law violators but “also a tool of oppression used by 
those in power as a means to control” and pacify the capacity of the 
lower class to challenge the pyramidal social arrangement of society 
(Waquant, 2009, p. 70). 
 
After American colonial rule, the deployment of ‘more state’ in 
the realm of the police, criminal courts, and prisons began to increase 
dramatically  during  the  dictatorship  of  Philippine  President  (1965- 
1986)  Ferdinand  Marcos.  Marcos  strongly  reinforced 
institutionalization of the urban poor as a criminal population in 1975 
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by criminalizing squatting through Presidential Decree 772. The law 
says that all squatters who occupy public and private lands illegally 
can  be  prosecuted  and considered  criminal  (Figure  5).   During  this 
time, squatter communities in Metropolitan Manila experienced the 
demolition and burning of their houses by municipal task forces and 
police officers. Metropolitan Manila’s Quezon City is home to North 
Triangle, a large region of urban poor where I have conducted 
ethnographic research. Many of its residents have been imprisoned for 
violent resistance to demolitions. Also, sidewalk vending, their main 
source  of  livelihood,  was  frequently  targeted  by  the  Metropolitan 
Manila  Development  Authority’s  (MMDA)  Task  Force  Zero 
Obstruction.   The MMDA’s chairperson stopped illegal vendors from 
‘plying their trade on sidewalks by ordering his men to spray kerosene 
on  the  goods  they  were  selling’  (David,  2007, para:  6)  and  burning 
them. In this manner, the vendors could not recover their investments. 
The chairperson also ‘ordered the confiscation of their carts, and 
detained those who persisted in occupying the sidewalks’ (David, 2007, 
para. 6). 
 
This militaristic style of controlling the poor through violence, 
which is common to demolitions and forced relocations in Metropolitan 
Manila (PhilRights and UPA, 2009), pushes the poor to commit crime 
to survive. Urban poor residents of North Triangle where I conducted 
research commit robberies and hold up buses, taxis and jeepneys 
(Philippine public transportation) that stop around the community. 
Unfamiliar faces in the community often are the moment’s victims of 
holdups and robberies. These criminal activities committed in the 
process of survival retain and reinforce the criminal identity of the 
community. 
 
Within the carceral city’s clustering of penality, poverty, and 
crime,  Philippine  governance  at  various  levels,  upper  class 
subdivisions, and businesses often have responded to the legal and 
economic  plights  of  the  poor  by  seeking  enhanced  safety  for  the 
middle-  and  upper-classes.  The  MMDA  has  installed  thousands  of 
CCTV cameras to perfect the surveillance of the urban poor criminal. 
In other cities in the Philippines, such as Davao, Cavite, and 
Maguindanao, mayors have innovated their own mechanisms of 
carcerality and penal law by operating vigilante groups that shoot and 
kill people they characterize as street robbers who either have been 
caught in the act of committing a crime or are engaging in activity that 
could be criminal.. 
 
The largest television network in the Philippines launched a 
project in June of 2012 that encourages citizen journalism by urging 
citizens to police their own neighborhoods through what the network 
calls CCTV Patrol, a mechanism of surveillance in which citizens use 
CCTV  footage   and   even   cellphone  footage  to   report  crime   they 
encounter  in  the  streets.  As  one  might  expect,  most  of  the  crimes 
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citizens have reported are crimes of the poor. Seventy percent of news 
reporting of Philippine media—print, radio and television—are about 
crime of the poor. 
 
The  image  of  criminality  has  a  huge  impact  on  the  lives 
residents of North Triangle and other urban poor communities like it. 
For example, the daughters of a resident named Sonia were not hired 
as sales clerks in a nearby department store when its human resources 
officer learned that they were living in North Triangle. The son of 
another resident, Teodora, was not accepted into Philippine Science 
High School even though he had passed the school’s entrance exam 
and had a high GPA. I also observed that Catholic residents could not 
go to church in a nearby middle-class subdivision because they usually 
were halted by community guards and chased by dogs. Teodora, 
secretary general of a North Triangle community organization, 
explained during an interview that most of the time residents could 
not acquire care in nearby specialized hospitals (Philippine Children’s 
Hospital, Lung Center of the Philippines, Philippine Kidney Institute) 
because they were not capable of paying the required deposit, which 
only residents of upper-level subdivisions could afford. Many children 
in the community did not have birth certificates, and many couples did 
not have marriage certificates even though the city hall is only a five- 
minute ride from their neighborhood. 
 
Like the lower-rung colonized ‘savage’ Filipinos who could 
connect to the resources of a ‘civilized’ Philippine elite and U.S. 
colonizers through patronage relationships, urban poor residents of 
North Triangle, while experiencing a criminal stigma that robs them 
of many opportunities, survive through the patronage and services of 
politicians, professors, nuns, priests, seminarians, students, non- 
governmental organizations, religious organizations, medical 
practitioners and social movements who go into the community with 
different agendas but the same objective of ‘helping.’ Professors and 
students from exclusive schools visit the community for their research 
and provide tutorials to members of community youth organizations. 
Catholic seminarians from San Jose Seminary and Saint Francis of 
Assisi usually immerse themselves in the community for two years for 
their required pastoral work before entering the priesthood. Medical 
students in the hospitals surrounding the community use it as a 
laboratory  for  practicing  medicine  under  sponsorship  of  the 
community’s medical mission. Churches in nearby subdivisions 
distribute used clothes  and groceries  to the community every 
Christmas  and conduct  a  Catholic  catechism class  among  its  youth 
every summer. Non-governmental organizations organize the 
community to attain their collective interest of security of housing, 
which, until now, remains a goal rather than a reality. NGOs often use 
the  poor  condition  of  the  community  in  their  proposals  to  funding 
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agencies for projects to uplift residents’ lives. They also mobilize the 
community   around   issues   such   as   the   environment,   corruption, 
national debt and globalization. 
 
The poor of the community survive also through the gifts and 
sponsorship of politicians. Poor clients obligated to politicians through 
patronage are an essential component of campaigns for elected office. 
Politicians, in partnership with local and national businesses, sponsor 
mass weddings and baptisms, sports festivals, and birthday 
celebrations. They also pay burial expenses for residents. During 
elections, politicians promise to protect squatters from demolition and 
legalize their residency on the public lands they occupy in exchange for 
their support. Politicians rarely are able to follow through on such 
promises, and the poor move no closer to the exercise of full citizenship 
or legal access to judicial processes through patron-client relationships 
that domesticate them and channel their important roles in electoral 
processes toward the interests of others. On the political patronage 
ladder the poor remain poor, squatters, and stigmatized as dangerous 
and criminal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has attempted to characterize a carceral state and 
city that have arisen from the racial foundations of imperial law by 
taking a brief journey through moments in the legal birth of U.S. 
imperialism and its legacies in the Philippines. Elite Filipinos have 
replaced U.S. colonial administrators in the ways Filipinos today 
practice a two-tiered system of Constitutional rights. The qualities of 
the rebellious, racially inferior Filipino that the U.S. created to justify 
its own imperial rule and law now clothe the poor, who occupy the 
second tier. Neighborhoods of the poor have been confined to poverty 
and pushed toward crime by their criminalization through punitive 
processes of a penal law that, most often, denies the poor access to 
justice; the construction of the poor as not qualified to exercise 
constitutional rights is  employed by both governmental and private 
organizations to demolish the homes of the poor, leaving their families 
without  property  or  shelter.  Postcolonial  theorists  call  this  rights- 
based hierarchy internal colonization. 
 
According to Stephen Graham in his book Cities Under Siege, it 
is all too easy for political, corporate or military elites to portray the 
residents of informal settlements as threats—as existential, even sub- 
human, threats—to the ‘formal’ neoliberal economy and its archipelago 
of privileged urban enclaves of residence, production, speculation, 
transportation, and tourism. Everywhere, the urban boundaries 
between the ‘insides’ and the ‘outsides’ of our planet’s dominant 
economic order present sites of palpable militarization as state and 
corporate security forces seek not only to police but also, often, to profit 
from the relations of conflict between insiders and outsiders that the 
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provision of security signifies and perpetuates. Shanty settlements are 
frequently bulldozed by government planners, police forces and 
militaries to  clear  the way for  modern infrastructure or real-estate 
development by addressing purported threats of crime or disease, or 
simply to push the marginalized populations out of sight.’ 
 
Metropolitan Manila, despite its failures in industrial 
development urban planning, continues to project the image of “a 
modern, world-class metropolis” by hiding the evidence of its 
weaknesses through managing the visibility of problems: of slums, 
congestion, disorder, disease, drugs, and disaster. It moves these 
problems out of sight through the criminalization, penalization and 
marginalization of the poor. Criminalization and penality, as Campbell 
explains, are instrumental in the rationalization, normalization, 
moralization, correction, civilization, punishment, discipline, disposal 
and formation of society. 
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